Coda

 

For everything there is a season, and that is no less true for blogs. In light of my previous post, I’ve decided to allow this blog’s season to come to its end. 

For those who have read, commented and engaged with me via Civicus, thanks. This blog has been an important part of my journey. 

For those interested in continuing to read, comment and engage with me, I’ll be continuing to blog over at Per Crucem ad Lucem, where Civicus’ posts have been imported.

Again, sincere thanks.

Where to blog?

A (modified) repost from Per Crucem ad Lucem:

Most of my blogging happens over at Per Crucem ad Lucem. But some time ago, I made the decision to blog occasionally at two additional sites – Civicus (a blog dedicated to issues broadly related to human rights and with a particular interest in Burma), and Paternal Life (a very occasional blog concerned with issues pertaining to being a dad). The decision to blog at various places was not made lightly. At the time I felt that the different foci could best be served by separating them out (much like the direction that biblical scholarship took in the last century). This would mean, I felt, that readers who were interested in the particular focus of the blog would be less likely to have to wade through copious posts that they were not particularly interested in. A downside of this decision has been that these three of my many passions – theology, human rights and fathering – have, as far as blogging goes, been kept separate, and do not share the perichoretic (probably an inappropriate word to use in this context) existence that they know in my own being. Consequently, I’m (inadvertently) sponsoring the idea that theology, human rights and parenting have little to do with each other, a notion which is of course utter baloney.  The other downside, though significantly less important than those already stated, is that maintaining three blogs takes more work.

So, I’ve been wondering about merging Civicus and Paternal Life with Per Crucem ad Lucem (the blog that I pour most of my energy into and which recieves the most hits); and the point of this post is to invite some comment about how you – my readers – and those who may have journeyed down a similar track feel about this proposal. Do you have a preference? What sorts of questions ought such a decision be required to consider? Would such a merger of interests be unduly isolationist for too many readers? Your thoughts?

Two interesting pieces … and one cause for celebration

1. William Pfaff on Should the Torturers Go on Trial?

‘The most effective way to prevent future war crimes is not to threaten elected leaders with punishment that probably will not be imposed. It is to convince civilian and military officials at all levels of government that if they commit or participate in war crimes, as clearly defined in international law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, even under orders of their superiors, the serious possibility will exist that (in another administration?) they will be appropriately punished’.

2. Jay Feldman reviews ‘Concentration Camps on the Home Front’

3. Death sentences commuted in Ghana

Pilger on Gaza

John Pilger has posted on ‘Gaza Under Fire’:

‘… what happens in Gaza is the defining moment of our time, which either grants war criminals impunity and immunity through our silence, while we contort our own intellect and morality, or it gives us the power to speak out’.

Full article here.

Robert Fisk: The self delusion that plagues both sides in this bloody conflict

During the second Palestinian “intifada”, I was sitting in the offices of Hizbollah’s Al-Manar television station in Beirut, watching news footage of a militiaman’s funeral in Gaza. The television showed hordes of Hamas and PLO gunmen firing thousands of rounds of ammunition into the air to honour their latest “martyr”; and I noticed, just next to me, a Lebanese Hizbollah member – who had taken part in many attacks against the Israelis in what had been Israel’s occupation zone in southern Lebanon – shaking his head.

What was he thinking, I asked? “Hamas try to stand up to the Israelis,” he replied. “But…” And here he cast his eyes to the ceiling. “They waste bullets. They fire all these bullets into the sky. They should use them to shoot at Israelis.”

His point, of course, was that Hamas lacked discipline, the kind of iron, ruthless discipline and security that Hizbollah forged in Lebanon and which the Israeli army was at last forced to acknowledge in southern Lebanon in 2006. Guns are weapons, not playthings for funerals. And Gaza is not southern Lebanon. It would be as well for both sides in this latest bloodbath in Gaza to remember this. Hamas is not Hizbollah. Jerusalem is not Beirut. And Israeli soldiers cannot take revenge for their 2006 defeat in Lebanon by attacking Hamas in Gaza – not even to help Ms Livni in the Israeli elections.

Not that Hizbollah won the “divine victory” it claimed two years ago. Driving the roads of southern Lebanon as the Israelis smashed the country’s infrastructure, killed more than a thousand Lebanese – almost all of them civilians – and razed dozens of villages, it didn’t feel like a Hizbollah “victory” to me, theological or otherwise. But the Israelis didn’t win and the Hizbollah were able to deploy thousands of long-range rockets as well as a missile which set an Israeli warship on fire and almost sank it. Hamas have nothing to match that kind of armoury.

Nor do they have the self-discipline to fight like an army. Hizbollah in Lebanon has managed to purge its region of informers. Hamas – like all the other Palestinian outfits – is infected with spies, some working for the Palestinian Authority, others for the Israelis. Israel has successively murdered one Hamas leader after another – “targeted killing”, of course, is their polite phrase – and they couldn’t do that without, as the police would say, “inside help”. Hizbollah’s previous secretary general, Sayed Abbas Moussawi, was assassinated near Jibchit by a missile-firing Israeli helicopter more than a decade ago but the movement hasn’t suffered a leader’s murder in Lebanon since then. In the 34-day war of 2006, Hizbollah lost about 200 of its men. Hamas lost almost that many in the first day of Israel’s air attacks in Gaza – which doesn’t say much for Hamas’ military precautions.

Israel, however – always swift to announce its imminent destruction of “terrorism” – has never won a war in a built-up city, be it Beirut or Gaza, since its capture of Jerusalem in 1967. And it’s important to remember that the Israeli army, famous in song and legend for its supposed “purity of arms” and “elite” units, has proved itself to be a pretty third-rate army over recent years. Not since the 1973 Middle East conflict – 35 years ago – has it won a war. Its 1978 invasion of Lebanon was a failure, its 1982 invasion ended in disaster, propelling Arafat from Beirut but allowing its vicious Phalangist allies into the Sabra and Chatila camps where they committed mass murder. In neither the 1993 bombardment of Lebanon nor the 1996 bombardment of Lebanon – which fizzled out after the massacre of refugees at Qana – nor the 2006 war was its performance anything more than amateur. Indeed, if it wasn’t for the fact Arab armies are even more of a rabble than the Israelis, the Israeli state would be genuinely under threat from its neighbours.

One common feature of Middle East wars is the ability of all the antagonists to suffer from massive self-delusion. Israel’s promise to “root out terror” – be it of the PLO, Hizbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Iranian or any other kind – has always turned out to be false. “War to the bitter end,” the Israeli defence minister, Ehud Barak, has promised in Gaza. Nonsense. Just like the PLO’s boast – and Hamas’ boast and Hizbollah’s boast – to “liberate” Jerusalem. Eyewash. But the Israelis have usually shown a dangerous propensity to believe their own propaganda. Calling up more than 6,000 reservists and sitting them round the Gaza fence is one thing; sending them into the hovels of Gaza will be quite another. In 2006, Israel claimed it was sending 30,000 troops into Lebanon. In reality, it sent about 3,000 – and the moment they crossed the border, they were faced down by the Hizbollah. In some cases, Israeli soldiers actually ran back to their own frontier.

These are realities. The chances of war, however, may be less easier to calculate. If Israel indefinitely continues its billion dollar blitz on Gaza – and we all know who is paying for that – there will, at some stage, be an individual massacre; a school will be hit, a hospital or a pre-natal clinic or just an apartment packed with civilians. In other words, another Qana. At which point, a familiar story will be told; that Hamas destroyed the school/hospital/pre-natal clinic, that the journalists who report on the slaughter are anti-Semitic, that Israel is under threat, etc. We may even get the same disingenuous parallel with a disastrous RAF raid in the Second World War which both Menachem Begin and Benjamin Netanayahu have used over the past quarter century to justify the killing of civilians.

And Hamas – which never had the courage to admit it killed two Palestinian girls with one of its own rockets last week – will cynically make profit from the grief with announcements of war crimes and “genocide”.

At which point, the deeply despised and lame old UN donkey will be clip-clopped onto the scene to rescue the Israeli army and Hamas from this disgusting little war. Of course, saner minds may call all this off before the inevitable disaster. But I doubt it.

Source: The Independent, Wednesday, 31 December 2008

Benedict Rogers on the International Crisis Group’s latest report

Burma is ruled by one of the world’s most brutal regimes, guilty not only of suppressing democracy but of causing one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. In response, the International Crisis Group (ICG)has lost the plot.

Earlier this year, Cyclone Nargis hit Burma. Unlike almost any other government in response to a natural disaster, the junta in Burma initially refused, and then restricted and diverted international aid efforts. Aid was stolen by the regime (pdf). Burmese people who tried to help deliver aid were arrested. The little aid that was officially distributed was given for propaganda purposes and often taken back when the photocalls were over. At least 140,000 people died and 2.5 million left homeless in the wake of the regime’s deliberate neglect.

Following the cyclone another humanitarian crisis has unfolded, this time in western Burma (pdf). Chin State (pdf) has been hit by a famine caused by a plague of rats who multiply due to flowering of bamboo, a natural phenomenon that occurs every 50 years. True to form, the regime did nothing to prepare the people for the anticipated famine and has actively obstructed aid efforts. Officials took the World Food Programme to the wrong area, causing them to declare there was no famine. Since then, the WFP has revised its view – but the regime continues to block attempts to help the starving Chin people.

Burma’s military is continuing an offensive against ethnic peoples in eastern Burma, causing further humanitarian misery. Since 1996, more than 3,200 villages have been destroyed, and a million people displaced. Civilians are shot at point-blank range, or raped, taken for forced labour or used as human minesweepers. Children are taken off the streets andforced to join the Burmese army, which has the highest number of child soldiers in the world. Over 2,100 political prisoners languish in jail, double the number of last year, subjected to horrific torture, and Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma’s pro-democracy leader and Nobel laureate, marked 13 years in house arrest last week.

The International Crisis Group says this is all our fault. In one of the most extraordinary reports ever produced by a responsible and until-now respected organisation, ICG provides a subtle defence of the junta and blames the international community for focusing too much on “the political struggle”. It was understandable, ICG suggests, that the regime “hesitated to provide full, unfettered access for anyone claiming to be doing relief work”, because the west has been putting the junta under so much pressure to stop killing its people. Western media is at fault too, according to ICG, for showing images of dead bodies being dumped by regime officials in the river – something that was “very embarrassing” for the poor generals.

While grudgingly conceding that the root causes of the crisis are political, ICG appears to reject the notion that the solutions are therefore political too. The report rightly calls for more aid to Burma, and support for civil society projects, and warns that the country is on the verge of a major humanitarian crisis. I agree. The stories and statistics speak for themselves. But ICG goes on to perpetuate the lie that pro-democracy activists oppose aid. In reality, it is campaign groups that have called for more aid.

It was the Burma Campaign UK and Christian Solidarity Worldwide that led the effort last year to get the UK government to increase aid to Burma – with success. We have been calling for more funding for civil society and democracy groups, for cross-border humanitarian relief and for UN engagement for years (PDF). Much of our time has been spent on getting the generals to talk with the UN, the democracy movement and the ethnic groups (PDF). What we have opposed is ICG’s call for money to go into the pockets of the regime – for the simple reason that the junta will use such finance to expand their army, buy more guns and kill more people. I thought ICG was about conflict prevention. Now it seems they are about regime protection.

[Source: Guardian]

DKBA soldiers attack Karen village in Thailand

 

Download report as PDF [ 455 kb]

After disputes over arbitrary taxation payments and accusations of favouring the KNLA, 40 to 50 soldiers of DKBA Battalion #907 – under brigade commander N’Kaw Mway – attacked the village of Mae Gklaw Kee in Thailand’s Umphang District. Troops shelled the village tract leader’s house, shot at villagers’ houses and then burnt down villagers’ crop storage barns. The Batallion subsequently set up a camp in nearby Gklaw Ghaw village. As SPDC and DKBA troops work together in an effort to take control of the area, villagers face increased restrictions, overlapping taxation demands, and the threat of future attacks and land confiscation.

On Saturday, October 4th 2008, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) officer Bla Nah, under the command of brigade commander N’Kaw Mway, led 40-50 soldiers of Battalion #907 in an attack on Mae Gklaw Kee village in Umphang District of Thailand (only three kilometres from the Burma border). After shelling the village tract leader’s house with a grenade launcher, soldiers shot at the villagers’ houses, shot out truck tyres and then burnt the villagers’ crop stores. After the attack, the soldiers set up camp in nearby Gklaw Ghaw village on the other side of the Burma border in Kawkareik township of Dooplaya District and are now working with nearby Light Infantry Battalions #401 and #407 of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)[1] to place movement restrictions on the villagers.

According to information collected by a KHRG researcher, a combination of factors seem to have led to this attack, with one of the major reasons being a refusal by the villagers (or inability) to pay the full amount of taxes demanded by the DKBA. As Mae Gklaw Kee village is located so close to the border, the villagers regularly travel back into Burma to work in their rented corn fields in the area around Bplah Doh village, close to Gklaw Ghaw village, in Maw Kee village tract of Kawkareik township. The area around Gklaw Ghaw and Bplah Doh villages is largely controlled by Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) Battalion #201, but SPDC and DKBA soldiers also operate in the area. Other villages in Maw Kee village tract closer to the DKBA base at Gaw Lay village are largely controlled by the DKBA. Villagers are therefore faced with competing tax demands as the different military groups vie for control of the area.

Corn fields farmed by local villagers have been particularly subject to these overlapping taxation demands. Each local corn field usually produces from 3,000 to 6,000 big tins[2] of sweet corn per year and sometimes up to 10,000 big tins. Each year, KNLA soldiers demand 10 Thai baht (US $0.29) for each sack of corn – one sack of corn cobs contains approximately seven big tins of corn – from local farmers (including Mae Gklaw Kee village) or an estimated 4,286 to 8,571 Thai baht (US $123.86 to $248.06) for a field with a normal yield. However, in 2007 the DKBA also placed a much higher tax demand on the corn produced by the villagers – demanding eight Thai baht (US $0.23) for each big tin of sweet corn and 100 baht (US $2.89) for each big tin of sweet corn seed. For a normal yield, this is equivalent to 24,000 to 48,000 Thai baht (US $694.40 to $1,388.80) per field (not including the tax on corn seed). Struggling to meet the demands of both armed groups, villagers from Mae Gklaw Kee village told DKBA soldiers that they could only afford to pay them three baht per tin, as opposed to the eight baht demanded. In response, the DKBA soldiers simply increased the tax demand for 2008, asking for 15 baht for each big tin of corn, approximately 45,000 to 90,000 baht (US $1,302.07 to $2,604.13) for a normal yield field and 150 baht for each big tin of seed. The villagers knew they would be unable to pay this amount following the harvest (which usually starts in October) and, the village tract leader reportedly referred to DKBA soldiers as ‘dogs’ for placing such demands upon the villagers. This apparently angered commander N’Kaw Mway and prompted him to call for the attack upon Mae Gklaw Kee village. At this time, the villagers had not paid any tax to the DKBA for 2008, as the harvest was not yet completed. A KHRG field researcher also noted the villagers’ support of the KNLA as another reason for the attack and the Bangkok Post referred to a ‘brawl’ between DKBA soldiers and local teenagers from the village in September as another motive for the attack.[3]

Since the attack on Mae Gklaw Kee village, SPDC and DKBA soldiers have been restricting the movements of villagers in the area around Gklaw Ghaw village in an effort to take control of the area away from the KNLA. In the past, KNLA soldiers have ambushed and attacked DKBA and SPDC soldiers operating in the area. However, although KNLA soldiers remain in the area, they have not yet attacked the new DKBA camp at Gklaw Ghaw. KNLA soldiers claim that they are currently hesitant to attack the camp at Gklaw Ghaw for fear of creating more problems for the villagers, after a recent spate of retaliatory actions by SPDC and DKBA soldiers against villagers for such KNLA attacks – such as the burning down of corn storage barns in the area.

Villagers in the surrounding area therefore face increased restrictions imposed by the SPDC and DKBA soldiers based at Gklaw Ghaw, as soldiers try to clamp down on any possible communication between villagers and the KNLA. In Gklaw Ghaw village itself, civilians have been forbidden to travel outside of the village, even for work or trade, and have also had their mobile phones confiscated.[4] Villagers in Mae Gklaw Kee have currently been able to remain in their village with increased security from Thai authorities, but still live with the threat of further attacks and the future of their corn field farming remains uncertain, given the increased troop build-up by SPDC and DKBA forces in the area.

DKBA soldiers have had a record of imposing arbitrary taxation demands upon villagers, with other villages in the area having faced similar problems to Mae Gklaw Kee. In another incident in 2007, DKBA soldiers succeeded in extorting more than the original eight baht per big tin of corn demanded, by pretending that they were also collecting tax for the KNLA. In this way, villagers from Gaw Lay, Htee Ther Lay and Oo Poe Hta villages (all also located in the large Maw Kee village tract in Kawkareik township) were forced to pay ten baht per tin of corn. Villagers have also been threatened with land confiscation for KNLA use of landmines. On October 6th 2008, DKBA Battalion #907 officers Muang Shwe Wa, Kyaw Pa Pu and Bo Kyaw Kyaw summoned village heads from Ler Gaw, Lay Ghaw, Oo Poe Hta, Oo Gray Hta, Wa Mee Hta, Maw Ker Hta and Gaw Lay villages to meet with them at the DKBA army camp in Gaw Lay village, where brigade commander N’Kaw Mway is based. During the meeting, the DKBA officers reportedly told the village heads that if any DKBA soldier in the area should step on a landmine planted by the KNLA, they would take away all of the lands owned by the villagers.

With money to be gained from agriculture, logging, mining and taxes upon villagers, the DKBA and SPDC are keen to gain control of this border area. As the various armed groups vie for control of village tracts on both sides of the Thai-Burma border (in Dooplaya District on one side and Umphang District on the other), villagers face competing demands for taxation on their crops, increased restrictions on their movement and communication, and the increased threat of attacks and land confiscation by the SPDC and DKBA.

For more information on the situation in Dooplaya District and the human rights abuses involved in DKBA and SPDC control in other areas of Karen State, see the following previously published KHRG reports:

Footnotes

[1] The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is the military junta currently ruling Burma.

[2] A ‘big tin’ is a local measurement of approximately 2 litres or 4.5 gallons in volume.

[3] ”Karen fighters attack village”, Bangkok Post, October 5th 2008, accessed athttp://www.bangkokpost.com/051008_News/05Oct2008_news12.php on October 9th 2008.

[4] Villagers were previously able to use Thai mobile networks to communicate with other villages in the area and in Thailand due to the proximity of the border, but are now unable to do so.

[Source: KHRG]

 

The Cost of War: Funding International War Crimes

The National Priorities Project of Washington DC has introduced a timely new function to their site, CostOfWar.com. Through the Individual Cost of War Calculator, U.S. taxpayers can see what portion they owe of the $590 billion and counting on the Iraq war.

www.CostOfWar.com has long provided the most accurate tally of the budget expenditures on the Iraq war with their War Cost Calculator. They have also allowed users to break down that total cost to their state or local area.

Now CostOfWar.com shows what portion of that 1/2 a trillion dollars each individual is responsible for. Users simply (and anonymously) input their income or taxes over the course of the Iraq war to see how much they personally paid, and will continue to pay.

For households making $75,000 a year, their cost of Iraq equates to approximately $20,000 to be paid toward the Iraq war right out of that family’s check book. Considering the failing economy, eye-opening information like this is sure to be a major issue in the U.S. Presidential race.

These calculations were originally launched in 2007 as MyWarTax.org. The founders, Jim Cousins and Don Raleigh of Minnesota, recently donated it to the National Priorities Project’s site, CostOfWar.com. The intent was to provide this information to a mass audience, and CostOfWar.com receives more than 100K hits each month.

Democracy fails without an informed citizenry, and CostOfWar.com is now informing people of their financial contributions to the Iraq War on an individual level.

[Source: Scoop]

Aung San Suu Kyi Refuses to Accept Food

In a developing move, detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi refused to accept a food delivery to her home one week ago, according to the exiled National League for Democracy – Liberated Area. The exiled group released a statement on Monday saying that Suu Kyi has refused to accept food from members of her party for nine days.

Last week, Aung San Suu Kyi cancelled two scheduled meetings with United Nations Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari during his visit to Rangoon. Observers said that Suu Kyi’s refusal to meet with the UN envoy showed her disappointment with his failed attempts to broker a solution to the country’s decades-old political standoff.

Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrest for 13 of the past 19 years. During most of this time, her food has been supplied exclusively by her colleagues.

[Source: Scoop]

Burma is hosting 2092 Political Prisioners

On the late night and early morning of 21st-22nd August 2007, one year ago, after leading peaceful protests against the sudden hike in fuel and commodity prices, 13 leading members of the 88 Generation Student’s Group were arrested by the Burmese authorities. They are:

Min Ko Naing (Paw Oo Tun): now more than 17 years total detention, Jimmy (Kyaw Min Yu): total detention more than 15 years, Mya Aye: a total of more than 8 years in detention, Ko Ko Gyi: a total time in detention of 14 years and 8 months Kyaw Kyaw Htwe (Marky): nearly 13 years in detention Arnt Bwe Kyaw: over 9 years in detention Pyone Cho: total of over 16 years in detention, Min Zeya: total of 7 years and 5 months detention Nyan Lin: a total of 7 years detention Ko Zeya: over 13 years and 7 months in detention Panneik Tun: a total of 8 years detention Zaw Zaw Min: a total of 1 year and 1 month detention Thet Zaw: already served a total of 10 years and 4 months.

These arbitrary arrests are part of an ongoing systematic persecution of activists, both social and political, by the Burmese Junta. In the last year there have been around 900 arrests of activists, some for things like helping the relief operation following Cyclone Nargis. Currently there are at least 2092 Political Prisoners being held in detention across Burma.

Political Prisoners in detention suffer massive hardships, inflicted on them systematically by the authorities, including severe physical and psychological torture, many interrogations, starvation, malnutrition and many different and serious health problems due to the conditions they have been held under. They also suffer prolonged and unlawful detention, no access to proper legal counsel, no free or fair trials and a methodical intrusion into their lives by the Burmese authorities, and those of their families and associates, both during their detention and throughout the times that they have been released. Due to this treatment throughout their years in detention, all Political Prisoners develop weak health, and are susceptible to illness. For example: Hla Myo Naung (member of 88 Generation Students Group, held in Insein prison, arrested at eye clinic, now awaiting sentence) has already lost the sight in one of his eyes and his other eye will also soon be blind, due to the neglect of the authorities in not providing proper medical treatment.

The current situation of the above 13 student leaders, arrested this time last year is that they have not seen a lawyer since their detention, and some of the charges under which they were first arrested have been changed. Some of them and their family members are not sure under which charges they are being held. None of them have been brought before a court of any kind, or been subject to a trial. None of them have been sentenced. Some are suffering from severe health problems and have not yet received proper medical treatment. Among the most urgent cases are Ko Min Ko Naing, whose eyesight is failing, has some serious health complications with his heart and has pain walking due to a problem with his foot and Ko Mya Aye is suffering from heart disease.

Including the last year, the 13 student leaders listed above, have served a total time in detention of 140 years and 1 month so far. That is enough. AAPP pays tribute to these Activists for their service to their country, their total commitment, creativity and strength in the face of a brutal military regime. AAPP strongly condemns the Burmese regime, who acts with impunity, for their systematic persecution of these activists. They have suffered these abuses because of their outspoken belief in human rights, their love for their country and their determination to replace military dictatorship with democracy in Burma.

Source: Scoop